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IN THE UATH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOHN BAXTER, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
SAUNDERS OUTDOOR ADVERTISING 
INC., a corporation, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
CaseNo.20060820-CA 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a final order of the 3rd District Court, concerning a motion for 
unlawful detainer, the Honorable Sheila McCleve, presiding. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction of this appeal to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3, and Rule 3 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Under Utah law, should the trial court have granted Appellant's motion for summary 
judgment? 
After Appellant filed his motion for unlawful detainer and the Appellee made no 
effort to pay rent, Appellant filed for summary judgment as all of the elements of the 
unlawful detainer action had been met. The trial court denied Appellant's motion for 
summary judgment. "When we review the district court's decision to grant summary 
judgment, we review the court's legal decisions for correctness, giving no deference, 
and review the facts and inferences to be drawn there from in the light most favorable 
4 
to the nonmoving party." JR. Simplot Co. v. Sales King Intern.. Inc., 2000 UT 92, 
1{13, 17 P.3d 1100, 1104 (quotations omitted). 
II. Under Utah law, did the trial court improperly grant summary judgment to the 
Appellee? 
The Appellee also filed for summary judgment on the Appellant's unlawful detainer 
action, and the trial court granted Appellee's summary judgment based on finding a 
condition precedent in the Lease Agreement. A trial court's conclusions of law in 
civil cases are reviewed for correctness and therefore no deference is given to the trial 
court's ruling on questions of law. See, State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). 
III. Did the trial court deny the Appellant his constitutional right to due process by 
denying him use of his property, and leaving him with no remedy to regain access? 
The trial court's decision to dismiss Appellant's motion for unlawful detainer without 
removing the Appellees from his property left Appellant with no recourse to regain 
access and use of this property. "When we review the district court's decision to 
grant summary judgment, we review the court's legal decisions for correctness, giving 
no deference, and review the facts and inferences to be drawn there from in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party." J.R. Simplot Co. v. Sales King Intern.. Inc.. 
2000 UT 92,1J13, 17 P.3d 1100, 1104 (quotations omitted). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Appellant submits that the following Statutes, Rules, and Constitutional provisions may 
be determinative of certain issues in this Appeal: 
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Utah Code Ann. §78-36-3(e)-Unlawful Detainer Statute 
(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer: 
(a) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, of the property or any part of it, 
after the expiration of the specified term or period for which it is let to him, which specified term 
or period, whether established by express or implied contract, or whether written or parol, shall 
be terminated without notice at the expiration of the specified term or period; 
(b) when, having leased real property for an indefinite time with monthly or other periodic rent 
reserved: 
(i) he continues in possession of it in person or by subtenant after the end of any month or 
period, in cases where the owner, his designated agent, or any successor in estate of the owner, 
15 days or more prior to the end of that month or period, has served notice requiring him to quit 
the premises at the expiration of that month or period; or 
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he remains in possession of the premises after the 
expiration of a notice of not less than five days; 
(c) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after default in the payment of 
any rent and after a notice in writing requiring in the alternative the payment of the rent or the 
surrender of the detained premises, has remained uncomplied with for a period of three days after 
service, which notice may be served at any time after the rent becomes due; 
(d) when he assigns or sublets the leased premises contrary to the covenants of the lease, or 
commits or permits waste on the premises, or when he sets up or carries on any unlawful 
business on or in the premises, or when he suffers, permits, or maintains on or about the premises 
any nuisance, including nuisance as defined in Section 78-38-9, and remains in possession after 
service upon him of a three days1 notice to quit; or 
(e) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after a neglect or failure to 
perform any condition or covenant of the lease or agreement under which the property is held, 
other than those previously mentioned, and after notice in writing requiring in the alternative the 
performance of the conditions or covenant or the surrender of the property, served upon him and 
upon any subtenant in actual occupation of the premises remains uncomplied with for three days 
after service. Within three days after the service of the notice, the tenant, any subtenant in actual 
occupation of the premises, any mortgagee of the term, or other person interested in its 
continuance may perform the condition or covenant and thereby save the lease from forfeiture, 
except that if the covenants and conditions of the lease violated by the lessee cannot afterwards 
be performed, then no notice need be given. 
Rule 56 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure-Summary Judgment 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in 
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
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there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered 
on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1 
Sec. 1. [Citizens of the United States.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 7 
§ 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case presents an appeal from and Order of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, dated August 28,2006, which dismissed Saunders' counterclaim, 
and made the previous order granting summary judgment and dismissing Mr. Baxter's unlawful 
detainer action ripe for appeal. 
Mr. Baxter filed his complaint for unlawful detainer on November 14, 2003, in order to 
evict Saunders from his property for failure to pay rent for more than three years. Mr. Baxter 
filed a motion for summary judgment in January 2004. The district court denied this motion in 
May 2004. 
Saunders filed a motion for summary judgment in September 2004. From here the course 
of proceedings gets complicated because of scheduling errors, and mistakes of the court. In 
November 2004 there was a pretrial conference held in which Mr. Baxter's attorney, Greg Wall, 
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was not present due to a scheduling error. Despite Mr. Wall's inability to attend the court 
granted Saunders' motion for summary judgment on November 1, 2004. R. 102. 
After Mr. Baxter objected to the order on Saunders' summary judgment the court agreed 
to hear more pleadings on the issue and suspend the order. In December 2004 the court 
reaffirmed its order on Saunders' summary judgment, but failed to send notice of this order to 
either party. In January 2005 Saunders filed a notice to submit, unaware the court had already 
ruled on the summary judgment issue. In April 2005, Mr. Baxter filed another motion to vacate 
the order and/or clarify it because of the lack of notice by the court. In July 2005, the court gave 
another ruling on Saunders motion for summary judgment, granting the motion. 
Immediately after in August 2005, Mr. Baxter filed a motion to dismiss Saunders 
counterclaim. In February 2006, the court denied Mr. Baxter's motion to dismiss. Mr. Baxter 
objected to this order immediately. The court reaffirmed the order in March 2006. A date for 
trial on the counterclaim was set for August 16,2006. Twelve days before the trial was to begin 
Saunders filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss their own counterclaim. Mr. Baxter did not 
oppose this motion, but asked for sanctions to be imposed, as it was the same motion Saunders 
had opposed a year earlier. No sanctions were imposed. The motion for voluntary dismissal was 
granted by the court in August 2006 and this appeal was filed nine days after, on September 6, 
2006. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
John Baxter is the owner of real property located at 1615 South State Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. R. 1. Located on Mr. Baxter's property is an outdoor advertising sign, which Mr. 
Baxter has a permit to advertise on. R. 1. Mr. Baxter and Saunders Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 
("Saunders"), entered into a Lease Agreement, ("Lease Agreement" or "Agreement"), on 
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February 14, 2000. R. 2, 4. Under the Lease Agreement Mr. Baxter leased to Saunders the 
property in question, for the purpose of using and erecting outdoor advertising signs, along with 
easements of ingress and egress for the purpose of maintaining and operating the outdoor 
advertising sign. R. 2, 4. In consideration for the use of the advertising structure, and the right 
to tear down the existing structure, Saunders agreed to pay Mr. Baxter 5,000 dollars up front and 
6,600 dollars per year, for the term of 15 years. R. 2, 4. The $5,000 covered rent payments 
which would start after Saunders obtained the necessary permits to build a new sign structure, or 
no later than December of 2000 if no permits were sought. R. 4. 
In November of 2003, the Appellant, John Baxter, filed a complaint for unlawful 
detainer against the Appellee, Saunders Outdoor Advertising Inc. R. 1-7. At the time the 
complaint was filed Saunders was in arrears in rent in the amount of $14,800. R. 1. In the three 
years since Mr. Baxter's complaint was filed, Saunders has failed to pay $19,800 in rent. Thus, 
as of the filing of this appeal Saunders is in arrears $34,600 in rent owed to Mr. Baxter. R. 4. In 
January of 2004, Mr. Baxter filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Saunders had 
defaulted on the parties Lease Agreement and the court should enter a judgment for unpaid rent 
and an order removing Saunders from Mr. Baxter's Property. R. 16-17. Judge McCleve denied 
this motion at a hearing in April 2004. R.59-60. 
In September of 2004, Saunders filed a motion for summary judgment against Mr. 
Baxter, arguing that no unlawful detainer action could be established because the terms 
necessary for the Lease Agreement to begin never occurred. R. 78-85. While arguing that the 
terms of the Lease Agreeement never began, Saunders still refused to vacate the premises and 
filed a counterclaim trying to enforce the Agreement in order to get a refund on their $5,000 
upfront payment. R. 31-36. Regardless of the contradictions in Saunders argument, Saunders 
continued presence on the property without payment, or the facts that were at issue, the Court 
9 
granted Saunders motion for Summary Judgment on November 1, 2004, and reaffirmed this 
order on December 21, 2004, and again on July 18, 2005. R. 102, 132-134, 176-178. 
Saunders' argument in their motion for summary judgment, which was accepted by the 
Court when it granted the summary judgment, was that no leasehold was created because the 
formation of the lease was based on conditions precedent that were never completed. R. 78-85. 
Saunders argued that the Lease Agreement did not commence until the permits were obtained to 
build a new sign. R. 78-85. 
In February of 2004 Saunders also filed a counterclaim, Mr. Baxter filed a motion to 
dismiss this counterclaim in August of 2005, and this motion was denied by Judge McCleve in 
February of 2006. R. 31-36, 179-183,227. In the counterclaim Saunders asks for a return of his 
initial $5,000 payment under the terms of the Lease Agreement. R. 31-36. Mr. Baxter filed a 
motion to dismiss this counterclaim because after the court granted Saunders summary judgment 
the issue of enforcing the Lease Agreement was moot. R. 132-134. The court had already ruled 
the terms of the Lease Agreement had never commenced. R. 132-134. Notwithstanding the 
court still denied Mr. Baxter's motion to dismiss. R. 227. However, in August of 2006, 
Saunders filed a motion to dismiss his own counterclaim based on the same arguments Mr. 
Baxter had made one year earlier. R. 255-256. The court granted this motion. R. 263-264. Mr. 
Baxter asked for sanctions against Saunders for opposing a motion that was clearly necessary, 
and then filing the same motion a year later. R. 261-262. No sanctions were granted by Judge 
McCleve. 
Directly after the court dismissed Saunders counterclaim Mr. Baxter filed this appeal in 
order to remove Saunders from his property and obtain a judgment for the seven years Saunders 
has occupied the property rent free. R. 265-266. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The facts of this case are egregious and the result extreme injustice. Mr. Baxter entered 
into a Lease Agreement seven years ago, because of health problems, to rent out his billboard 
sign to Saunders for $550.00 per month. Under the terms of the Agreement, Saunders had the 
option to tear down the old sign and build a new one. Saunders' has never made any effort to 
exercise this option, but refused to pay rent. After waiting three years Mr. Baxter filed a motion 
for unlawful detainer, and both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court 
incorrectly granted Saunders motion for summary judgment. Mr. Baxter's unlawful detainer 
action was complete and valid. The trial court based its' ruling on the finding that a condition 
precedent delayed the commencement of the terms of the lease. There is no condition precedent 
explicit in the terms of the lease and therefore summary judgment in favor of Saunders was 
incorrect. However, at the very least, the terms of the Lease are material questions of fact that 
precluded a summary judgment in favor of Saunders. The trial court's decisions have denied Mr. 
Baxter use of his property without due process, and left him with no remedy to regain access. 
This court must correct this injustice and restore Mr. Baxter to possession and use of his own 
property. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court should have granted Mr. Baxter's motion for summary 
judgment, removed Saunders from his property, and ordered a judgment for 
unpaid rents. 
The trial court should have granted Mr. Baxter's motion for summary judgment in the 
unlawful detainer action. Mr. Baxter filed a complaint for unlawful detainer in district court in 
November 2003, in order to remove Saunders from his property after Saunders failed to abide by 
the terms of the parties' Lease Agreement for more than three years. In denying Mr. Baxter's 
motion for summary judgment the court stated, "the plaintiff has failed to state a basis upon 
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which he requests the Court to grant relief." R. 176-178. The trial court gave no further 
elaboration as to what elements of Mr. Baxter's unlawful detainer action failed to state a claim. 
A prima facie case for unlawful detainer includes proof that a person "continues in 
possession . . . after a neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or 
agreement under which the property is held . .. and after notice in writing . .. remains 
uncomplied with for three days after service." Utah Code Ann. §78-36-3(e). 
The facts of this case are simple. The Parties entered into a Lease Agreement. Saunders 
took possession of the property but refused to pay rent. Saunders also failed to obtain the 
permits and build a new sign as he had the option to under the terms of the Agreement. On 
September 23, 2003, Mr. Baxter served on Saunders a notice to quit or pay rent. R. 6. The 
validity of this notice has never been challenged. These facts support an action for unlawful 
detainer because every element of the statute is fulfilled. Saunders continued in possession of 
Mr. Baxter's property after he had neglected to pay rent as due under the Lease Agreement, Mr. 
Baxter gave notice in writing, and Saunders did not comply within three days. 
Saunders should have been removed from the property three years ago, and a judgment 
entered for unpaid rents. The trial court made no findings that any element of the unlawful 
detainer statute had not been fulfilled. Notwithstanding, the court dismissed Mr. Baxter's 
unlawful detainer action and left him with no remedy to regain possession and use of his 
property, for what is now seven years. 
DL The summary judgment granted in favor of Saunders should be reversed 
because both the law and facts of this case do not support the decision. 
a. The terms of the Lease Agreement do not support the trial court's finding for 
summary judgment for the Appellee. 
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The summary judgment granted by the lower court in favor of Saunders must be reversed as 
a matter of law, to enforce the existing contract between the parties, and restore equity. Under 
rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure a summary judgment may only be granted if given 
all the facts the petitioner has no case under existing law. In granting the summary judgment the 
Court found that "there was no real issue of material fact in this matter since the cause of action 
was . . . based upon a lease agreement which provided rent to start only after a billboard sign had 
been built." R. 133. Thus, the Court based its decision on the finding that there was no Lease 
Agreement because building a new sign was a condition precedent to the formation of the lease. 
"A condition precedent is one which must be performed by the one party to an existing contract 
before the other party is obligated." Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 37-38 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). Furthermore, "[t]he intention to create a condition in a contract must 
appear expressly or by clear implication." Cheever v. Schramm, 577 P.2d 951, 953 (Utah 1978). 
There is no explicit language in the lease agreement that creates a condition precedent. 
The language the court relied on in the Lease Agreement, under numeral one, reads, "It is agreed 
that the terms of this lease shall commence upon completion of the installation of the structure 
which is the subject mater of the lease agreement but not commencing later than pending permits 
12-1-00 or longer if need be pending permits." R. 4. Saunders argued before the trial court that 
because they never built a new sign, as they had the option to do under lease agreement (see 
special terms R. 4), the terms of the lease agreement never commenced and therefore they had no 
obligation to pay rent. R 34. 
This reasoning is not only erroneous under the terms of the agreement, but 
unconscionable. The terms cited above explicitly state that the terms of agreement would start 
no later than 12-1-00. R. 4. The only exception is made for pending permits. Saunders has 
never applied for any permits to build a new sign. R. 71. In his own words, "I did not file for an 
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off premise sign permit or any type of sign permit." R. 71. Therefore, at the very latest the 
terms of the agreement commenced on December 1, 2000, and Saunders has been in breach since 
that date. Furthermore, the idea that the Agreement could not commence until Saunders built a 
new sign, but they have no obligation to build that sign is unconscionable. No reasonable person 
would agree to such terms, and even if the trial court found the terms of the lease to be 
ambiguous they should have interpreted it against the drafter, which was Saunders. Instead, the 
trial court condoned this reasoning, which allows Saunders to occupy and profit from Mr. 
Baxter's property indefinitely with no obligation. 
Saunders places blame on Mr. Baxter for their delay in tearing down the old sign, and 
thus their inability to comply with the terms of the Agreement. However, the facts show that no 
one, including Mr. Baxter, interfered with Saunders ability to obtain a building permit, or build a 
new sign. In Saunders Affidavit in Response to Mr. Baxter's motion for Summary judgment 
Robert Saunders stated, "Plaintiff thereafter did refuse to allow the defendant to tear down the 
structure nor would he allow us to obtain the necessary permits to move forward to erect the new 
billboard structure as the terms of the agreement provided." R. 24. However, later Saunders 
admitted in their answers to PalintifPs interrogatories that "He [John Baxter] never did stop me 
from tearing down the old structure, I simply was not going to go to the expense of tearing down 
the old sign and build a new one and have John own it." R. 70-71. Saunders admitted on the 
record that it was and is their decision to not build a new sign. R. 70-72. They cannot be 
allowed to profit from this material breach. 
b. Summary judgment was incorrectly granted because there are disputed 
issues of fact. 
The Appellant argues that there was no condition precedent to the formation of a lease 
or the Appelle's obligation to pay rent. However, at the very least the starting date of the lease 
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and determining whether a condition precedent existed are material facts that should have 
precluded a motion for summary judgment in favor of Saunders. The summary judgment was 
incorrectly granted and left Mr. Baxter with no recourse to gain revenue from his property. The 
Court allowed Saunders to not exercise his option under the contract to build a new sign, while 
claiming there was no obligation to pay rent for the existing sign. Under this decision Saunders 
could refuse to build a new sign for eternity and still never pay Mr. Baxter for their use of the old 
sign. This result is an injustice that must be corrected. 
The Court's decision that the terms of the Lease Agreement never commenced because of 
a condition precedent is not supported by contract law or the facts of this case. The validity of 
the Lease Agreement and who is responsible for the breach are disputed facts that must be 
addressed in Court. The summary judgment granted in favor of Saunders must be reversed. 
III. The trial court's handling of this case has resulted in a violation of due process 
and left Baxter without remedy to regain possession of his property. 
a. Due Process 
The decisions of the lower court have denied Mr. Baxter his constitutional right to due 
process. Mr. Baxter came to the district court to find a remedy at law to regain control of his 
property. Instead, he has not had possession, rent payments, or profits from his property for 
seven years. "No principle is more fundamental to the integrity of a society that claims 
allegiance to the rule of law than the principle that a person may not be deprived of his property 
without first being afforded due process of law. This guarantee is enshrined in both the United 
States Constitution and the Constitution of Utah." Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco Consultants, 
Inc.. 2007 UT 17,128, citing U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1; Utah Const, art. I, § 7. 
Mr. Baxter correctly filed a motion for unlawful detainer, which action should have 
removed Saunders from his property. Instead Mr. Baxter has been without the use of his 
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property for seven years. In addition to the trial court's improper granting of summary 
judgment, the court further delayed Mr. Baxter's ability to appeal and therefore his right to due 
process. 
The courts failure to serve notice caused further delay that robbed Mr. Baxter of the right 
to use his own property. In November 2004, the court entered an order on Defendant's motion 
for summary judgment. R. 102. This order was entered after a pre-trial conference where Mr. 
Baxter's counsel was not present due to a scheduling error. Before entering the order, the court 
did not hear testimony or argument regarding the motion for summary judgment from Mr. 
Baxter. In addition, the issue of summary judgment was not scheduled to be argued at the 
pretrial. As a result of this hasty decision, the court allowed further pleadings to be filed on the 
issue of summary judgment before signing the order. R. 103-09. However, after the court heard 
from both parties, neither party was notified of the court's final decision. "The clerk of the court 
inadvertently failed to inform counsel of the ruling." R. 177. After not be informed of the 
court's ruling the Appellant was forced to request another hearing to amend the order to allow 
for an appeal, further delaying Mr. Baxter's use of his property. 
This appeal was also delayed by the courts denial of Mr. Baxter's motion to dismiss 
Saunders' counterclaim. After the court found summary judgment in favor of Saunders their 
counterclaim was moot. The court found the terms of the Lease Agreement had not commenced, 
therefore Saunders could not enforce the Lease Agreement as stated in their counter claim. R. 
31-36. However, in August of 2005 when Mr. Baxter filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim, 
the court denied the motion. Instead, the trial court waited a year to dismiss the counterclaim at 
Saunder's request in August of 2006. This delayed Mr. Baxter's appeal for a year and the trial 
court has allowed Saunders to remain in control of the sign, advertise on the sign, and collect 
rents for such advertising—all while paying the rightful owner of the sign nothing for seven 
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years. Mr. Baxter has a constitutional right to possession of his property, which right has been 
denied without remedy. 
b. No Remedy 
Mr. Baxter asked the trial court in April of 2005 to clarify its ruling so that Mr. Baxter 
could regain control of his property. R. 137-142. No clarification was made. Even if the court 
correctly granted summary judgment to Saunders, Judge McCleve should not have allowed them 
to maintain possession of the property. If there was no Lease Agreement then the court should 
have ordered Saunders to quit the premises. Each month's delay in this case costs Mr. Baxter 
considerable revenue. Mr. Baxter is entitled to regain possession of his property by using the 
procedural devices of the courts. His rights have been denied and can only be restored through 
this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The right to own and use property is a fundamental constitutional right in America. Mr. 
Baxter has been denied this right because of the trial court's granting of summary judgment in 
favor of Saunders. It is nonsensical to think that Saunders can possess and profit from Mr. 
Baxter's property without any obligation to pay rent. The trial court has left Mr. Baxter without 
remedy to regain access to his property. This Court must fix this injustice by reversing the trial 
court's ruling and restoring Mr. Baxter's possession of his property and entering a judgment 
against Saunders for unpaid rents and breach of the Lease Agreement. Mr. Baxter has already 
been denied seven years of income and profit from his property, further delay can and should be 
avoided by this Court. Mr. Baxter respectfully asks this court to reverse the decision of the trial 
court. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £ | day o 
iberly M. Hammond 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Gregory B. Wall, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered eight copies of 
the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114-0230, and four copies to the Appellee, Scott W. Holt ,44 North Main Street 
Layton, Utah 84041, this &\ day of February, 2007. 
iberly M. Hammond 
DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Appellant as indicated above 
this 6i\ day of February, 2007. 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit "A" 
Lease Agreement signed by the parties February 14,2000. 
Exhibit "B" 
Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
Exhibit "C" 
Order on Motion for Summary Judgment and Pre-trial Hearing 
Exhibit "D" 
Ruling 
Exhibit "E" 
Order for Voluntary dismissal of Defendant's Counterclaim 
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EXHIBIT A 
maunders 
O U T D O O R A D V E R T I S I N G I N C . 
3133 Lincoln Avenue 
P.O. Box 706 
Ogden, Utah 84402-0708 
(801)621-2350 
LEASE AGREEMENT 
The undersigned (hereinafter referred to as "Lessor") in possession or control of the premises described below and having full 
right and authority in said premises, hereby grants to LESSEE; Saunders Outdoor Advertising, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as 
"Lessee"), the exclusive right to use said premises for the purpose of erecting and maintaining outdoor advertising signs and other 
advertising media thereon, with or without illumination, and further grants to Lessee during the terms of this lease and for a reasonable 
period thereafter an easement across said premises as may be reasonably necessary for the ingress and egress of Lessee's men and 
equipment to erect, illuminate, repair, maintain and remove said structure outdoor advertising signs or other advertising media. 
1. It is agreed that the terms of,ihys lease^shali commence upon completion of the installation of the structure whjf h is the subject matter of this lease agreement 
but not cojDJpencing later than faf/M!&/?„. /£&*<'. T.f.... /J..' /.". &^..tf./.^*.(t.,y°e€i ** / V ^ ' - ^ fc<e,„fYS 
2. "Tfheprem'ises are located in the County of.. "i&;7. f/?rrf'. , Stale of. /< / . r&rf\ and more particularly described as follows: / . , / \ 
•' I** 3. *''3mm\&. .SA/c SAteJ. .Si //.. tiff*. £</>/,. <:,/J.. &#///... .?&.. S.£^. MV/. / /C jA«d.(*4r.'. v/s 
•:::±. 
'7-
3. The lease shall be for a term o f . . . / . ^ (# of years) commencing on the date of the first payment described in paragraph 1, The lease shall be 
automatically renewed for an additional term of the same length, subject to all of the terms and conditions contained herein unless Lessee gives written notice of its 
intention to terminate at least one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the end of said period. Thereafter, the lease shall be automatically extended for additional periods 
of the same length subject to all of the terms and conditions contained herein unless cither party hereto gives one-hundred twenty (120) days written notice of their 
intent to terminate prior to the end of such renewal period. In the event that Lessor shall terminateViis lease, Lessor agrees not to lease said premises for advertising 
purposes to any other party other than Lessee for a period of three (3) years after the date of termination. nination. \ 
The annual rental for the premises above described shall be Jf.. .<£?•. (p. C&..... cSJ'X iJ}<WfflAV..kf)t. tiWr DOLLARS ($<^.C*&P. 
) which shall be payable to Lessor at the address shown below jn . . JJ?. . payments of. d. .«'.*{£. Jifi4fy/Jl<&/. ./y./^V,... DOLLARS ($ . 
S p e c i a l T c r m s v ^ W r ^ . ^ 6 . . (&<&$-. . l i ) . ^ / T ^ ^ < ^ . " ^ ^ C ' ^ . T ^ f ^ . T f r V t / . A 6 / / ^ . ) . Up^fcyJt.. ±'QT 4j*r.. . . 
•" ••••^
,
 /* • ' • / r/y • i^/j'^'fl,!: >,' J / ' r V 
M Tv'.4 :\Mkt.. &.V.4... £•?. .d; \\: 9. .?.<PS/<?t... ^ .o.-yd.»? *i .vf .*... S&±A.f^d £CS. . . y^i.l I. M f-. ./. * 4 * i !X:*jJ... 4.£*>. fry?.*'0 
, 5'. < f/'V... «<v. J.(•?.. ,<V?V5.f! //•.*^/*^r.Cc&rA %fcr:. 
:' ;; ?>. Lessof will not permit any other advertising media to be placed within 500 feet of the premises. 
' % 6. Lessof will not allow anything upon the premises which would interfere or obstruct Lessee's structure. 
*£}*1\ The parties hereby specifically agree that all signs, billboards, or other advertising media placed upon the described premises shall remain tne property ot 
Lessee and may be removed'at-aiYjftime and in no event be considered fixtures and a part of the really even though a portion of same might be affixed to real property. 
8. Lessor acknowledges and agrees that Lessee shall be entitled to, but not obligated to defend, prosecute or otherwise participate in any litigation respecting 
,. said advertising structure or media and Lessor agrees to give Lessee notice of all such proceedings served upon it. 
9. 
binding upon the parties hereto and their respective heirs, personal representatives, successors and assigns. 
10. This lease is subject to Lessee obtaining stale and local approval for location of advertising structures and is cancelable by Lessee if such consent is not 
obtained. If during the term of the Lease, the Lessee, at its sole discretion, determines the premises to not be sufficiently suitable for its advertising purposes, Lessee 
may terminate this lease upon 30 days written notice. 
RIGHTS OF FIRST REFUSAL; in the event Lessor shall decide during the term of this lease to sell the premises described herein. Lessor shall give written notice 
to Lessee of the terms and price offered by a third party. Lessee shall be entitled for thirty (30) days to acquire the premises on the terms and conditions in said notice. 
If Lessee does not exercise said right of purchase, the Lessor shall not sell the premises on other terms for six (6) months. Thereafter Lessee shall have the same right 
as to any subsequent offer to purchase. 
No party hereto is bound by any warranty, stipulation, representation or agreement not contained herein,;. This lease shall inure to the benefit of and be 
DATED: ^ - / < / - £(DOC) 
(Owner or Owner s agent) 
•Z&0&" <^1~r ^&!^-r^ 
ACCEPTED; 
Lesst. 
ftyg^^---— *Zz^y _T-^VSg-*^<-t<!> . . . (Lessor's Printed Name) 
Address: J7 .3 .2 . ZrA^/sA. ./!&.:. .Qf.r(*M/ # f . P&* / 
.gr&fTT. rJf^&y?.. /&<?. <^r/Z-
y
 te.g.f 
(Lessor's Address) 
B..^^..^.^.?..J.^r?T.<^ 
(I.D. or Social Security Number) 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
STATE OF ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF ) 
On the day of ,19 , personally appeared before me *, tfie signer 
of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same and was duly authorized to do so. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
EXHIBIT B 
SCOTT W. HOLT, #1532 
Attorney for Defendant 
44 North Main Street 
Layton, Utah 84041 
Telephone: (801) 546-1264 By 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAY 1 2 ^ 
SALT t k b ( 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN BAXTER, ; 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. , 
SAUNDERS OUTDOOR ] 
ADVERTISING, INC., a corporation ; 
Defendant. ] 
I ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
) JUDGMENT 
) Case No. 030925365 
) Judge Sheila McCleve 
]£< This matter having come on regularly for oral argument on the / / day of APRIL, 
2004, upon the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment before the Honorable Sheila McCleve. 
Present were Gregory B. Wall, attorney for the Plaintiff, and the defendant together with its 
counsel, Scott W. Holt. The Court, after having reviewed the Motion for Summary Judgment 
and affidavits together with the responses thereto and after review of the underlying lease 
agreement and hearing oral argument presented by the parties respective counsel and for good 
cause thereby appearing, enters the following Order, namely: 
1. That the Court finds that there are material issues of fact and denies Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this day of 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Denying Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment was mailed to the Attorney for Plaintiff, Gregory B. Wall, at 
4460 S. Highland Drive #200, Salt Lake City UT 84124, this (#_ day of^TTLty,, 2004 by 
depositing same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid. 
(^ y f ^ y L t y >• 
1
 duufajw^ nJo i^C -
Secretary 
N O T I C E 
TO GREGORY B. WALL, ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF: 
You will please take notice that the undersigned, Attorney for Defendant, will submit the 
above and foregoing ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT to the Judge of the above-entitled Court for his signature, upon the expiration of 
five (5) days from the date this Notice is mailed to you, and after allowing three (3) days for 
mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504(2) of the 
Rules of Practice in the District Courts of the State of Utah. Kindly govern yourself accordingly. 
DATED this Q? day of [M-P*? 2004 
SC^ 
Attorney for Defendant 
EXHIBIT C 
SCOTT W. HOLT, #1532 
Attorney for Defendant 
44 North Main Street 
Layton, Utah 84041 
Telephone: (801) 546-1264 By. 
FILED OSiTRiOT O0UBT 
Wtird Judicial District 
DEC U 2004 
SALJr LAl/JrQ)UNTY 
* 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN BAXTER, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs.
 > 
SAUNDERS OUTDOOR ] ADVERTISING, INC., a corporation ; 
Defendant. ] 
) ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
) JUDGMENT AND PRE-TRIAL 
) HEARING 
) Case No. 030925365 
) Judge Sheila McCleve 
This matter came on regularly for Pre-Trial hearing on the 1st day of November, 2004 
before the Honorable Sheila McCleve, one of the Judges of the above entitled Court. Neither the 
Plaintiff nor his attorney appeared or were present and Defendant was represented by its 
attorney, Scott W. Holt. 
The Court, after reviewing the file and pending Motions before this Court and for good 
cause appearing, hereby makes the following observations, ruling, and judgment in this matter 
and enters the following Order: 
1. That the parties were required to appear at the time and place scheduled for this 
Pre-Trial conference, which hearing setting was made in open Court to the parties and also by 
the written Order of the Court. 
2. That the Clerk of the Court telephoned Plaintiffs counsel before the Court 
proceeded with the hearing and that the Court waited approximately 45 minutes after the 
scheduled time for Plaintiffs counsel to appear and that neither Plaintiff nor his attorney 
appeared for the Pre-Trial Hearing. 
3. That the Court reviewed Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs 
Objection and Response to the same and Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs Response in this 
matter. 
4. That the Court, after review of the said Motions and Response, does hereby grant 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, that the Court finds that there was no real issue of 
material fact in this matter since the cause of action was based upon a complaint for unlawful 
detainer based upon a lease agreement which provided for rent to start only after a billboard sign 
had been built and that said structure had never been erected and that Plaintiffs Complaint and 
cause of action is hereby dismissed for good cause thereby appearing with prejudices. 
5. That the Court will proceed with Defendant's Counterclaim in this matter and that 
the Defendant will schedule a further scheduling conference when the issues presented therein 
are ready for trial if the parties are unable to resolve the remaining issues as are contained 
therein. 
6. That the Court takes under advisement the issue of awarding attorney's fees to 
Defendant's counsel for Plaintiffs attorney's failure to appear for thgJS»«^6jllihearing. 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER ON MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND PRE-TRIAL HEARING was mailed to the Attorney for 
Plaintiff, Gregory B. Wall, 2168 East Fort Union Blvd., Salt Lake City, UT 84121, this ? 
day of November, 2004 by depositing same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid. 
Secretarv 
y 
N O T I C E 
TO GREGORY B. WALL, ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF: 
You will please take notice that the undersigned, Attorney for Defendant, will submit the 
above and foregoing ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND PRE-TRIAL 
HEARING to the Judge of the above-entitled Court for his signature, upon the expiration of five 
(5) days from the date this Notice is mailed to you, and after allowing three (3) days for mailing, 
unless written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504(2) of the Rules of 
Practice in the District Courts of the State of Utah. Kindly govern yourself accordingly. 
DATED this ^ d a y of November, 2004. 
SCOTT W. HOLT, 
Attorney for Defendant 
EXHIBIT D 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN BAXTER, i RULING 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 030925365 
vs. : 
SAUNDERS OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, : 
INC., a corporation, 
Defendant. 
This Court scheduled a pretrial/scheduling conference on 
November 1, 2004. Neither plaintiff nor his attorney appeared, 
even after the clerk called to inform him that we were waiting for 
him to appear. His appearance was not excused. The Court heard 
several other matters, waited another 2 0 minutes, and proceeded 
with the hearing. Plaintiff's attorney never called the Court, nor 
made any appearance. 
The Court reviewed the pleadings and instructed defendant to 
prepare an Order granting defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
When plaintiff received notice of the Order, he requested oral 
argument on the Summary Judgment, which the Court allowed and 
stayed entry of the Order. 
After oral argument, the Court took the case under advisement 
and informed the attorneys that it would rule on the matter before 
Christmas. The Court decided for the defendant and on December 
BAXTER V. SANDERS 
OUTDOOR ADVERTISING PAGE 2 RULING 
21st, signed the November 1st proposed Order interlineating the 
December date. The clerk of the court inadvertently failed to 
inform counsel of the ruling. Unknown to the Court, the clerk 
responded to defendant's later Request for Decision in January with 
a copy of the Summary Judgment Order, which only defendant's 
counsel acknowledges having received. Plaintiff then requested 
another hearing, which the Court again allowed. 
The Court finds that the plaintiff has failed to state a basis 
upon which he requests the Court to grant relief. Therefore, his 
Motion is denied. The previously entered Order remains in effect. 
Defendant's counsel is to prepare the Order denying 
plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Order. 
Both plaintiff and defendant to be notified by mail. 
Dated this <Q day of July, 2005. 
SHEILA K. 
DISTRICT COURT 
BAXTER V. SANDERS 
OUTDOOR ADVERTISING PAGE 3 RULING 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Ruling, to the following, this, of July, 2005: 
Gregory B. Wall 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2168 E. Fort Union Blvd. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Scott W. Holt 
Attorney for Defendant 
44 N. Main Street 
Layton, Utah 84041 
EXHIBIT E 
SCOTT W. HOLT, #1532 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
44 North Main Street 
Layton,Utah 84041 
Telephone: (801) 546-1264 
B y ™ 
!>;,,.><<< 3' 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN BAXTER, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. , 
SAUNDERS OUTDOOR ] ADVERTISING, INC., a corporation ] 
Defendant. ) 
1 ORDER FOR VOLUNTARY 
) DISMISSAL OF DEFENDANT'S 
> COUNTERCLAIM 
) Case No. 030925365 
) Judge Sheila McCleve 
The Court having received the Motion for Voluntary Dismissal of Defendant's 
Counterclaim and it appearing in compliance with Rule 41(c) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
hereby grants Defendant's request to dismiss its counterclaim as against the above named 
Plaintiff, and for good cause thereby appearing, it is hejcu/
 r x. 
ORDERED that Defendant's Counterclaim fflh&reby dismissed without prejudice as 
against the Plaintiff. fa 
DATED this ^Jp day of August, 20C 
IILA MC CLEVE 
District Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER FOR 
VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM was mailed to the 
Respondent, Gregory B.Wall, at 2168 E. Fort Union, Salt Lake City UT 84121, this _ft day 
of August, 2006, by depositing same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid. 
Secretary 
N O T I C E 
TO Plaintiffs Attorney, Gregory B. Wall: 
You will please take notice that the undersigned will submit the above and foregoing 
ORDER FOR VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM to the Judge 
of the above-entitled Court for his signature, upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date this 
Notice is mailed to you, and after allowing three (3) days for mailing, unless written objection is 
filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah State Rules of Civil Procedure. Kindly 
govern yourself accordingly. 
DATED this / ^ d a y of August, 2006. 
SCOTT W. HOLT 
Attorney for Defendant 
